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ARTICLES
BAD BEHAVIOR MAKES BIG LAW:
SOUTHERN MALFEASANCE AND THE
EXPANSION OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
POWER, 1954-1968
DAVID J. GARROWt
The story of the Warren Court's impact on the U.S. South is
of course far larger and more wide-ranging than just the direct
legacy of Brown v. Board of Education.1 Indeed, this is a
question of not just "Beyond Brown," or, better yet, "Beyond
Brown and Baker,"2 but of appreciating how the obstructive
behavior of the South, in the face of Warren Court rulings,
affected the wider judicial decision-making of the Court just as
much as the Court's holdings altered so many aspects of southern
life, both public and private.
Brown is a major part of that story, as is Baker and its
decisive, Deep South progeny, Reynolds v. Sims. 3 Yet there are
at least four other important and often-overlooked chapters in
this story as well: first, the Court's own frightful and halting
behavior in other, little-known and sometimes tragic race cases
in the immediate wake of Brown;4 second, the ways in which the
Court's belief in racial equality significantly spurred its efforts to
reform criminal justice procedures nationwide; 5 third, the
tremendously under-appreciated manner in which the activism of
* Prepared for "Beyond Brown: How the Supreme Court Shaped the Modern
South," University of Sussex, Brighton, 22-24 March 2007.
t Homerton College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 8PH.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4 See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 355 U.S. 839 (1957); Naim v.
Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Williams v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 950 (1956); Jackson v.
Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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the southern Black freedom struggle stimulated the Court to
vastly expand federal judicial jurisdiction in ways that helped
protect the constitutional rights of any citizen prosecuted in a
southern state court;6 and fourth, the degrees to which even
ostensibly unrelated areas of substantive federal law, ranging
from First Amendment rights of association, 7 to the law of libel,8
to the procedural protections afforded public aid recipients, 9 all
were likewise transformed on account of the collision between the
Warren Court and white public authorities in the South. All told,
that larger story is one whose scope far exceeds the standard
narrative about Brown and race, or even the more expansive one
about Brown and Baker's explicitly shared grounding in the
fundamental guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. 10
PART I
But the story of the Warren Court and the South begins not
with Brown, nor even with the other very important, yet far
lesser known Brown decision that preceded Earl Warren's arrival
at the Court by a mere eight months.11 Instead it begins with the
South's long-troubled relationship to the rule of law, reaching
6 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe
to the extent it held municipalities are immune from § 1983 claims). Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes overruled in part both Townsend and Fay. 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (rejecting
the "deliberate bypass" standard for habeas relief in state procedural default cases),
superceded by statute as stated in Evans v. Thompson, 465 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass.
2006) (noting that the AEDPA controls the granting of evidentiary hearings on
habeas issues).
7 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gibson v. Fla. Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
8 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
9 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (overruling Shapiro to the extent it permitted
retroactive payment of withheld benefits in contravention of the Eleventh
Amendment).
10 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 483, 566 (1964) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)); see also David J. Garrow, From Brown to Casey: The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Burdens of History, in RACE, LAW AND CULTURE:
REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 74, 74-79 (Austin Sarat ed.,
1997); Michal R. Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown v. Board of Education:
The Genesis of the Warren Court's Quest for Equality, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 863, 887-88
(2004) [hereinafter Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown].
11 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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back to the antebellum era before the Civil War, Emancipation,
and the adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the
Constitution. Writing almost seventy years ago, Charles Sydnor
argued that the South's difficulty in accepting the rule of law was
rooted in the very nature of a slave-owning society. "[Ruralness,
slavery, the plantation system, and the existence of a strong
unwritten code operated in the plantation areas of the Old South
to restrict the power of ordinary law and to enlarge the area of
life in which man acts without reference to legal guidance. This
is to say that the segment of life that was controlled by law was
reduced in these dominant regions of the Old South.
'12
Sydnor believed that "ruralness lightens the weight of the
law" and that "the countryman is something of an individualist
who shapes his actions according to local custom and his own
notions of how he should behave rather than according to the
dictates of law books." In significant part this was so simply
because "he is physically remote from law-enforcing agencies."
But rural isolation was only one causative factor. Slavery itself
was another, Sydnor suggested. "Slavery must have affected the
planter's attitude toward law, for in a measure slavery put him
above the law. On his own estate he was lawgiver, executive,
and judge," and "[he] possessed power normally exercised by the
state."13
Sydnor appreciated that the geographical aspects of slavery
were not central to a slaveowner's behavior. Oftentimes "[l]aw
books gave him no guidance," Sydnor observed, "[b]ut this silence
of the law does not seem to have disturbed him, for even when it
spoke clearly the slaveowner sometimes paid no heed ... or
interpreted it with marked liberality."1 4  In doing so, Sydnor
noted, slave-owners were acting in full accord with the decisions
of southern state courts. In 1850, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals opined that "a judicious freedom in the administration of
our police laws for the lower order must always have respect for
the confidence which the law reposes in the discretion of the
master."15
"[T]he social order diminished the force of law in the South,"
Sydnor realized, and the antebellum power structure served "to
12 Charles S. Sydnor, The Southerner and the Laws, 6 J. S. HIST. 3, 8 (1940).
13 Id. at 8, 10.
14 Id. at 10.
15 State v. Boozer, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 21, 24 (S.C. Ct. App. 1850).
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restrict the segment of life ruled by state law." Indeed, he added,
"the extralegal ... areas of life in the South convinced many
onlookers that here was a land where law was frequently broken
and commonly held in contempt."16  Sydnor's conclusions
primarily concerned the antebellum nineteenth century South,
but subsequent well-informed scholars have extended his
observations to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
as well.
In the late 1940s, Carl Swisher underscored the value of
considering the South "as an isolated area, or as a collection of
isolated areas," especially with regard to how southerners often
exhibited "a kind of harshness of attitude toward outsiders." 17
More than a generation later, Paul Finkelman, in looking back at
the entire sweep of southern legal history, reiterated both Sydnor
and Swisher's analyses in highlighting not only "the tradition"
but indeed "the philosophy of localism" across the South.
"Southern localism sometimes emerged as hostility toward the
federal government," Finkelman noted, but "Southern localism
has not been directed at the federal government alone. It also
has produced xenophobia toward other states and their
citizens."18
Much like Sydnor, Finkelman too drew a direct connection
between geography and race: "[Tihe localism of southern legal
history perpetuated the fundamental institutions of the South:
slavery and racial discrimination. Localism reflected a belief
that no one ... should interfere with the institutions of the
South." One upshot of that long-term pattern was "the existence
of fewer and weaker legal institutions [in the South] than in the
North;" another was the general scholarly consensus that the
South has always been "more lawless than the rest of the
Nation."1 9
The late nineteenth century featured the rare racial equality
victory such as Strauder v. West Virginia,20 but only in the early
16 Sydnor, supra note 12, at 12-13.
17 Carl Brent Swisher, The Supreme Court and the South, 10 J. POL. 282, 294,
305 (1948).
18 Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 100,
110, 115 (1985).
19 Id. at 103, 109, 116; see also Sheldon Hackney, Southern Violence, 74 AM.
HIST. REV. 906, 906 (1969); John Shelton Reed, To Live-and Die-in Dixie: A
Contribution to the Study of Southern Violence, 86 POL. SCI. Q. 429, 430 (1971).
20 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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twentieth century did the Supreme Court begin to exercise the
sort of critical review of southern legal misconduct that gradually
began to point towards the types of criminal justice holdings that
would define the post-Brown era. 21 Michael Klarman has traced
the Court's progression from Moore v. Dempsey22 in 1923 to the
successive pair of Scottsboro cases, Powell v. Alabama23 and
Norris v. Alabama,24 in 1932 and 1935, to Brown v. Mississippi25
in 1936. All four cases concerned black defendants, and while
Klarman rightly observes that "the linkage between the birth of
modern criminal procedure and southern black defendants is no
fortuity," he also correctly notes that "none of these rulings had a
very significant direct impact on Jim Crow justice" in the
South.26
The fact that "these Supreme Court decisions made little
practical difference to southern blacks enmeshed in the Jim Crow
legal system" says less about the power of the Supreme Court
than it does about the disinterest and defiance with which
southern state judges responded to federal constitutional
mandates. Norris, Klarman observes, "was defied without
repercussion for an entire generation" in the South and
exemplified how "a state judiciary determined to have its way
and willing to dissemble in doing so possessed a wide variety of
means for frustrating federal court intervention."27
Gerald Rosenberg, like Klarman, emphasizes the important
point that Brown v. Board of Education actually did not
fundamentally alter the South's pre-existing attitude toward the
U.S. Supreme Court: "The white South had been ignoring Court
decisions throughout the twentieth century" from well before
21 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368
(1915); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911).
22 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
23 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
24 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
25 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
26 Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. 48, 48-49 (2000); see also Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial
Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305-06 (1982)
(observing that "there can be little doubt that" those cases "made new criminal
procedure law in part because the notorious facts of each case exemplified the
national scandal of racist southern justice").
27 Klarman, supra note 26, at 79, 95.
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1954.28 But essentially all of those notable criminal procedure
rulings in cases from the South in the years before Brown,
including the other Brown, Brown v. Allen from North Carolina
in 1953, were ostensibly decided as holdings that did not directly
or expressly concern race. As George Thomas has insightfully
pointed out, "race was often the 'elephant in the room,' the
unspoken reason that the Court granted certiorari and reversed
state court judgments .... [e]ven though race was almost never
the articulated reason" for the Court's decision. 29
None of these criminal procedure cases, not even the
Scottsboro duo, are anywhere near as well remembered by either
civil rights scholars or most legal historians as are the much
more explicitly racial cases involving the so-called "white
primary" which culminated in Smith v. Allwright30 in 1944, the
graduate school desegregation decisions which climaxed in
Sweatt v. Painter3' in 1950, or even more singular pre-Brown
rulings striking down segregated seating practices in interstate
public transportation 32 and racially restrictive covenants. 33 But
the criminal procedure decisions reflected a deep and continuing
suspicion toward the South and southern judicial practices on the
part of the Court, a suspicion that would become visible and
explicit in the post-Brown years. Brown indeed represented a
climax of the racial equality rulings that reached from Gaines to
Sweatt, but school segregation stood far from alone in the Court's
concerns about the vindication of constitutional rights
throughout the South both before and after May 17, 1954.
28 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Bringing Politics Back In, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 309, 316
(2006); see also Klarman, supra note 26, at 95 ("The criminal procedure decisions of
the interwar period foreshadowed the southern white response to Brown v. Board of
Education.").
29 George C. Thomas III, Through a Glass Darkly: Seeing the Real Warren Court
Criminal Justice Legacy, 3 OHIO ST. J. CR1M. L. 1, 6-7 (2005).
30 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
31 339 U.S. 629 (1950); see also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
32 See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
33 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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PART II
Brown v. Board of Education itself has been the subject of
such extensive discussion and analysis that only one utterly
crucial truth about the Brown I opinion requires reiteration here.
As Scot Powe has succinctly put it in his insightful and indeed
landmark book on the Warren Court, the tangibly essential
question of "[w]hat is school segregation?" was one that Chief
Justice Warren's unanimous opinion for the Court simply "never
addressed." 34  One need not fully embrace Powe's further
argument that Warren's Brown I opinion "failed in all its
functions except result," and most especially in not offering a
persuasive argument to the white South regarding the
constitutional necessity of desegregated schooling, in order to
appreciate how very, very little Brown I actually said about what
full compliance with its ruling should entail.35
It is of course even better known, to quote Powe again, that
the Court's 1955 opinion in Brown II "read like a southern
victory."36 The inherent indeterminacy of the Court's memorable
invocation of "all deliberate speed"37 was coupled with an ongoing
failure to address or explain exactly what the elimination of
racially segregated schooling would require. That twice-repeated
error then directly opened the door for the exceptionally
influential interpretive handiwork that Chief Judge John J.
Parker of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied to the two
Brown rulings when the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott,
was remanded to its three-judge lower court panel in the wake of
Brown II.
Parker's savvy brilliance on behalf of continued segregation
did not defy the letter of Brown even as it appeared to contravene
its spirit. The Supreme Court, Parker wrote, "has not decided
that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools
or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of
the right of choosing the schools they attend. What it has
decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny
to any person on account of race the right to attend any school
that it maintains." Thus, Parker continued, "if the schools which
34 LuCAs A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 50 (2000)
[hereinafter POWE, THE WARREN COURT].
35 Id. at 45.
36 Id. at 57.
37 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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it maintains are open to children of all races, no violation of the
Constitution is involved even though the children of different
races voluntarily attend different schools."
38
Nothing in the pair of Brown decisions, Parker went on,
"takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they
attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid
such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It
merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
segregation." 39
In the years immediately after Parker's judicial tour de force,
the Supreme Court's most notable, and indeed justly famous,
follow-up ruling on school desegregation was of course Cooper v.
Aaron,40 resolving the internationally notorious standoff that had
occurred at Little Rock's Central High School. Cooper, like
Brown, has been extensively discussed and analyzed, and its
status as a landmark declaration of the Court's uppermost role in
propounding the law of the Constitution is widely acknowledged.
But within the narrower and more immediate or short-term
context of post-Brown school desegregation in the South, Cooper
was all bark, no bite. As Scot Powe has pointedly asserted, "[t]he
rhetoric of Cooper v. Aaron was the boasting of the weak. The
Court's claim of judicial supremacy, where its decisions became
the Constitution, was bravado substituting for an inability to do
anything."'41
Far less well-known than Cooper, but far more indicative of
the actual reality of southern school desegregation in the late
1950s, was Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education,42 a
one-sentence per curiam Supreme Court affirmance of a lower
court ruling holding that Alabama's new pupil placement law
could not be presumed to be unconstitutional in advance of its
actual implementation. Such "freedom of choice" plans built
upon Judge Parker's distinctions in Briggs, but the Supreme
38 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
39 Id.
40 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
41 L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review: Reflections on the
Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 713-14
(2003).
42 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
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Court's tolerance of them meant that the "constitutional rights of
African-Americans could be delayed as necessary."43
Scot Powe accurately represents the scholarly consensus
when he observes that "the great victory in Brown had little
follow-up" because "the Court was missing in action" for almost a
full decade apart from Cooper and Shuttlesworth.44 But while
that conclusion is well-known across a great sweep of
historiography, the full extent of the Court's nervous evasion of
any further potential confrontations with southern legal norms
and southern state courts in the years immediately after Brown
is not widely appreciated or understood. Four separate cases
illuminate the depth and extent of that High Court evasiveness,
and each one of them merits a succinct characterization.
Cumulatively, they highlight how exceptionally hesitant and
deferential the Warren Court was toward post-Brown southern
legal malfeasance until the Black freedom struggle gathered full
force in 1960 and 1961.
Linnie Jackson was an Alabama black woman who was
sentenced to five years' imprisonment for the crime of marrying
A.C. Burcham, a man who happened to be white. The Alabama
Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction, and the Alabama
Supreme Court denied review. 45 When her petition arrived at
the U.S. Supreme Court in the fall of 1954, less than six months
after Brown I, Justice William 0. Douglas's law clerk, Harvey M.
Grossman, told the Justice that "[ilt seems clear that the statute
involved is unconstitutional," pursuant to Brown. However,
Grossman added, "review at the present time would probably
increase the tensions growing out of the school segregation cases
and perhaps impede solution to that problem, and therefore the
Court may wish to defer action until a future time." Nonetheless,
Grossman went on, considering the "serious consequences to the
petitioner" if the High Court failed to act, "review is probably
warranted even though action might be postponed until the
school segregation problem is solved."46
43 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 164.
44 Id. at 171, 177.
45 See Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 72 So. 2d 116
(Ala. 1954).
46 Memorandum from Harvey M. Grossman, Law Clerk, to Justice William 0.
Douglas (Nov. 3, 1954) (on file with Library of Congress, Justice William 0. Douglas
Papers, Box 1156), quoted in Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of
Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s-1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 416
2008]
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Douglas agreed that the Court should grant Jackson's
petition for review, as did Chief Justice Warren and Justice Hugo
L. Black,47 but three votes was one fewer than necessary for
certiorari to be granted, and when her petition was denied, none
of the Justices publicly dissented. 48 Linnie Jackson went to
prison for five years for the crime of interracial marriage.
49
Jackson's penalty was not the worst that would befall black
victims of the Warren Court's pusillanimous conflict avoidance.
Aubry Williams was a black Georgian whose 1953 conviction
for murdering an Atlanta liquor store owner came at the
hands of an all-white jury whose selection procedure was held
unconstitutional in a separate case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court less than three months later.50 Notwithstanding that
ruling, the Georgia Supreme Court subsequently affirmed both
Williams's conviction and his sentence of death by execution.
51
When Williams's attorneys lodged a further appeal, the Georgia
court again rejected it.52
Williams then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari in October 1954.53 The Court heard argument
the following April, and in early June 1955, by a six-to-three
vote, the Justices announced that Williams was entitled to a new
trial but held back from formally ordering one. 54 Complicated
(1994); see also PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE,
MARRIAGE, AND LAW-AN AMERICAN HISTORY 179-80 (2002) [hereinafter
WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE].
47 See Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim,
and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 153 n.148 (1998) (citing Cover
Sheet to Memorandum from Grossman to Douglas, supra note 46).
48 Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954). Six months later, when a five-
Justice majority dismissed a case from Iowa challenging the constitutionality of
racially segregated cemeteries, Black, Warren, and Douglas dissented publicly,
asserting that the issue should be decided. See Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park
Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 80 (1955) (Black, J., dissenting); see also STEPHEN L. WASBY
ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER 132-35 (1977).
49 See Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court
Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1475 (1994); see also
POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 71.
50 See Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561-63 (1953); Dickson, supra note 49, at
1427-29.
51 Williams v. State, 78 S.E.2d 521, 524 (Ga. 1953). But see Coleman v. State,
523 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. 1999) (disapproving of the language that the trial court used to
instruct the jury on reasonable doubt).
52 Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. 1954).
53 Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 854 (1954).
54 Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 389-91 (1955); see also Jerry K. Beatty,
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and worthy doctrinal considerations underlay the majority's
decision to remand the case in the manner that was chosen, 55 but
just two days later the Georgia Supreme Court responded with a
defiantly unanimous opinion declaring that the U.S. High Court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the decision that it had. 56
As Del Dickson recounts in his impressively detailed and
original account of Williams, the following month the board of
governors of the Georgia Bar Association unanimously approved
a resolution congratulating the Georgia court for its response. 57
Amongst the Justices on the U.S. Court, discussion shifted away
from Williams's right to a new trial and "debate began to focus
instead on how to limit the potential harm to the Court" itself
from the Georgia court's defiance. 58 Following almost two full
months of further private deliberations about Williams's case, 59
in mid-January 1956 the Justices voted unanimously against any
further grant of certiorari. 60 On March 30, 1956, Aubry Williams
was electrocuted at Reidsville State Prison.61
Linnie Jackson's unsuccessful appeal of her five-year
sentence for committing the crime of interracial marriage may
have passed almost without public notice, but Williams v.
Georgia attracted widespread attention all across the South.
Dickson argues that Williams "was widely seen" as an "outright
capitulation in the face of determined state resistance" and
indicated "that the Warren Court was likely to retreat when
confronted by determined state resistance."62
And Williams was not alone. At the very same time that the
Justices were mulling whether to retreat in full in the face of the
Georgia Supreme Court's defiance, they were confronted with a
State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates During the Last
Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 260, 283 (1972) (noting "the
reluctance of the Supreme Court to summarily reverse a state court decision on first
appeal" even in the 1960s).
55 See Dickson, supra note 49, at 1432-56, for a detailed and comprehensive
narration of the Supreme Court's private discussions and deliberations leading up to
the Williams decision.
56 Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 1955).
57 Dickson, supra note 49, at 1470.
58 Id. at 1459.
59 Id. at 1459-64.
60 Williams v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 950 (1956).
61 See Dickson, supra note 49, at 1465; see also Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court
Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1017, 1021 (1959).
62 Dickson, supra note 49, at 1426, 1480.
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direct appeal of a Virginia case, Naim v. Naim, which posed the
same fundamental question they had refused to address in
Jackson. In Naim, Virginia's courts had cited their state's anti-
miscegenation law in siding with a white woman, Ruby Elaine
Naim, who sought an annulment of her out-of-state marriage to a
Chinese man, Ham Say Naim, who could be deported if his
marital status was voided. 63 In early November, 1955, Justice
Felix Frankfurter wrote his colleagues to underscore "'the
Court's responsibility in not thwarting or seriously handicapping
the enforcement of its decision in the segregation cases'" by its
handling of Naim. More pointedly, Frankfurter said that "'to
throw a decision of this Court other than validating this
legislation into the vortex of the present disquietude
would... seriously, I believe very seriously, embarrass the
carrying out of the Court's decree of last May'" in Brown 11.64
After some uncertainty and confusion among the Justices,
including at least initial tentative acceptance of the case by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Black, and Stanley F.
Reed, 65 the Court unanimously remanded Naim v. Naim to the
Virginia Supreme Court in an unsigned per curiam opinion that
purported to assert that the factual record in the case was
insufficiently clear enough to allow a decision. 66 Virginia's high
court, however, understandably responded that the necessary
facts were quite clear,67 and the case then again returned to the
U.S. Supreme Court. On March 12, 1956, the Justices, having
already resolved the necessity of ducking the constitutional
contradiction that Naim directly presented, dismissed the appeal
for supposedly lacking "a properly presented federal question."68
The available historical record is silent as to whether Ham Say
Naim was indeed then deported to China. 69
63 Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750-51, 756 (Va. 1955), vacated by 350 U.S.
891 (1956).
64 Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Other Supreme Court
Justices (Nov. 4, 1955) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd Library, John
Marshall Harlan Papers, Box 11), quoted in WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE
MY WIFE, supra note 46, at 182.
65 See Dorr, supra note 47, at 153-55.
66 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1956).
67 Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Ga. 1956).
68 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
69 See POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 71-73; see also WASBY ET
AL., supra note 48, at 140-41.
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Naim was an embarrassing dodge explainable, at least in the
Justices' eyes, by the perceived sensitivity of the particular
subject matter. Virgil Hawkins's case from Florida involved no
such sensitivity, and indeed presented a question the Supreme
Court had considered and decided more than fifteen years earlier
in Gaines: the admission of a black applicant to an all-white state
university law school. Hawkins began his effort to enroll in 1949,
and after several fruitless trips to the Florida Supreme Court,70
his petition reached the Supreme Court while Brown v. Board of
Education was under consideration. One week after Brown I was
announced, the High Court remanded Hawkins's case to the
Florida Supreme Court "in the light of the Segregation Cases
decided May 17, 1954.. . and conditions that now prevail."71
However, the Florida court, after failing to act for more than
sixteen months, then refused to order Hawkins's admission to the
still-segregated state university law school on the grounds that
the intervening opinion in Brown II authorized local courts to
decide the best time for initial desegregation. 72 Hawkins again
returned to the U.S. Supreme Court, and on March 12, 1956, the
Justices issued a brief ruling citing Sweatt, Sipuel, and
McLaurin and noting that Brown "did not imply that decrees
involving graduate study present the problems of public
elementary and secondary schools." More particularly, they
informed the Florida court that Brown II "had no application to a
case involving a Negro applying for admission to a state law
school." They instructed that in the case at hand, "there is no
reason for delay. He is entitled to prompt admission under the
rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates."73
But the Florida court still refused to relent. After another
delay of almost an entire year, a majority of the Florida justices
again spurned Hawkins's appeal for immediate admission.74
70 See State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 53 So. 2d 116 (Fla.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 877 (1951); State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 60 So. 2d 162 (Fla.
1952); see also Darryl Paulson & Paul Hawkes, Desegregating the University of
Florida Law School: Virgil Hawkins v. The Florida Board of Control, 12 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 59, 59-62 (1984).
71 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
72 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 83 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. 1955); see also
Paulson & Hawkes, supra note 70, at 62-64.
73 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 413-14 (1956).
74 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 93 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1957); see also
Beatty, supra note 54, at 264 (noting especially "the evasiveness of southern
supreme courts"); Paulson & Hawkes, supra note 70, at 64-68.
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Back to the U.S. Supreme Court went Hawkins once more, but
this time the Justices quietly washed their hands of the matter
in a brief order that denied certiorari "without prejudice to the
petitioner's seeking relief in an appropriate United States
District Court" in Florida. 75 Hawkins followed that path, but was
initially rebuffed by U.S. District Judge Dozier DeVane, whom
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals quickly reversed.7 6 Florida
then altered and toughened the law school's previous admissions
standards so as to make Hawkins ineligible, and when the case
returned to the district court, Judge DeVane finally issued an
injunction prohibiting the law school from admitting only white
students. Virgil Hawkins entered a graduate program at Boston
University in Massachusetts, but another black applicant became
Florida's first black law student in September 1958. 77
Hawkins was a judicial embarrassment of the highest order:
even three years after Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court was
unable to desegregate the University of Florida Law School by
securing the admission of a black student who had been
attempting to enroll for over eight years. As Robert J. Glennon
has argued, Hawkins demonstrated how "[a] determined state
court could find ways to evade a higher court's rulings," for "even
explicit directions from the Supreme Court did not deflect
the Florida court from its efforts to maintain an all-white
university."78  Hawkins's personal misfortune may not have
equaled that of Aubry Williams, Linnie Jackson, or presumably
Ham Say Naim, but all four individuals can rightly be seen as
victims of Brown-unfortunate people whose personal fates had
to be sacrificed as part of the far more momentous institutional
task of protecting Brown from outright defiance or evisceration.
Del Dickson has made the overview argument more strongly
and cogently than anyone else: "[T]he Warren Court sought to
protect its own authority and the integrity of Brown by
attempting to avoid potentially damaging confrontations with
75 State ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 355 U.S. 839 (1957).
76 Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 253 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1958).
77 Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 162 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Fla. 1958); see also
Murphy, supra note 61, at 1020-21, 1030-31 n.62; Paulson & Hawkes, supra note
70, at 68-70; MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 235-38 (1994); POWE, THE WARREN
COURT, supra note 34, at 63-65.
78 Robert J. Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement,
61 TENN. L. REV. 869, 883 (1994).
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Southern governments over ancillary racial issues, even when
serious individual injustices resulted." In Williams, just as in
Jackson, Naim, and Hawkins, "the Justices feared that a
showdown with the Southern states over this case would cost the
Court too dearly in terms of image and authority, undermining
the Court's efforts to secure Southern compliance with Brown."79
But Dickson further argues that the Court's strategy was not
only costly, but a failure. The stand-down in Williams, he writes,
"helped to spark a Southern backlash against the
Warren Court and inspired increased opposition to the
Court's desegregation policies." To "Southern elites-especially
government officials and lawyers," Dickson explains, Williams
(and Hawkins even moreso) demonstrated "that it was possible
for the South to stand up to the Warren Court on issues of race
and get away with it," and showed how "the costs of
noncompliance with the Court's desegregation decisions were
likely to be quite low. 8 0
PART III
But the Court's efforts to minimize further open conflict with
southern courts and officialdom made perfect judicial sense.
William Ross's superb and under-appreciated study of political
attacks on the Warren Court stresses how even before Brown,
and before Warren's own arrival, there had been a "growing
antagonism toward the Court by a broad range of conservatives
during the period between 1937 and 1954." Starting a full
decade before Brown, high-impact rulings such as Smith v.
Allwright, which struck down the politically-decisive all-white
Democratic primary, had "particularly antagonized many
Southerners."8' The most thorough and careful histories of the
mid-1950s also point out how neither Brown I nor Brown II
generated any immediately highstrung southern backlash.
8 2
Indeed, only as the Montgomery Bus Boycott began to attract
79 Dickson, supra note 49, at 1426, 1478.
80 Id. at 1426, 1469, 1479.
81 William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study
of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 487, 489 (2002).
82 See FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 27, 40
(1973); MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER 29 (1987); see
also David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v.
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 158-59 (1994) [hereinafter Garrow,
Hopelessly Hollow History] (surveying and summarizing the historiography).
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regional attention in the early weeks of 1956, and as Autherine
Lucy's short-lived desegregation of the University of Alabama
generated intense segregationist turmoil,8 3  did "massive
resistance" objections to Brown's promise of widespread school
desegregation finally build to a white-hot glow. 8 4
The symbolic leading edge of that resistance, the so-called
"Southern Manifesto," signed by one hundred southern members
of the U.S. Congress, was issued on March 12, 1956-perchance
the very same day that the U.S. Supreme Court refused to decide
Naim v. Naim and unsuccessfully attempted to instruct the
Florida Supreme Court to order Virgil Hawkins's admission to
the University of Florida School of Law!8 5 As Anthony Lewis
wrote a decade later, the "true meaning of the Manifesto was to
make defiance of the Supreme Court and the Constitution
socially acceptable in the South-to give resistance to the law the
approval of the Southern Establishment."8 6
But the "Manifesto" was more a prolegomena, and not the
crest, of the increasingly vituperative attacks on the Warren
Court. As both Scot Powe and William Ross cogently emphasize,
the intensifying southern anger at the prospects of real
desegregation resulting from the new upsurge in Deep South
Black activism was soon augmented and amplified by more
widespread anger over a pair of new anti-subversion decisions by
the Court. The particulars of Pennsylvania v. Nelson8 7 and
Slochower v. Board of Education88 need not be recounted here,
but in the political context of the day, just three weeks after the
"Manifesto," both rulings were easily susceptible to simple-
minded categorization as "pro-Communist." As Powe writes,
"Nelson and Slochower were a godsend to southerners. The
decisions gave them allies against the Court-national security
conservatives," and also gave white southerners "an opening to
legitimize their criticisms" that were grounded in race-"an
opening they gladly took."8 9
83 See Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala.), afl'd, 350 U.S. 1 (1955);
Adams v. Lucy, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956); see
also WASBY ET AL., supra note 48, at 164.
84 See Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History, supra note 82, at 158-59.
85 See supra notes 67, 72.
86 ANTHONY LEWIS & N.Y. TIMES, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE 45 (1964).
87 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
88 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
89 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 84-85.
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Ross observes that "the already intense controversy over the
Supreme Court suddenly escalated and greatly broadened during
the spring of 1956,"90 but the temperature rose even further
during the next term of Court. A dozen cases involving
communism were on the docket, and as the term progressed,
each successive ruling sided with those alleged to have
subversive affiliations. Then, on June 17, 1957, which critics
soon labeled "Red Monday," the Court issued four more decisions,
each of which struck down one or another form of prosecution or
persecution of supposed Communists. 91 As Powe comments, the
rulings were "nothing short of astounding," for "[olver the entire
term, the communist position had been sustained every time."
92
One week later, in Mallory v. United States, the Court
overturned a criminal conviction and death sentence for a brutal
rape on the grounds that the defendant's confession was
improperly secured. 93 That decision added yet more fuel to the
fire. 94 As Ross observes, "[t]he Court's decisions on subversion
and crime rapidly transformed organized opposition to the Court
from an isolated southern phenomenon into a nationwide
movement" that saw more Court-curbing legislative proposals
receive "serious consideration during 1957-58 than at any time
in the nation's history."95 In addition, the Court's critics received
the public blessing of U.S. Circuit Judge Learned Hand, arguably
the nation's most respected jurist, in a trio of lectures Hand
delivered at Harvard University in early 1958.96 Nonetheless,
the Court-curbing movement began to lose steam, and then
90 Ross, supra note 81, at 497.
91 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957),
overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (overruling prior cases to the
extent that they recognized appellate courts' authority to order a new trial following
a finding that the prosecution's evidence was legally insufficient); Service v. Dulles,
354 U.S. 363 (1957); see also ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME
COURT AND RED MONDAY 138-72 (1999).
92 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 98.
93 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).
94 See CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT & ITS CRITICS 43-44, 73-76
(1968); see also Murphy, supra note 61, at 1023-25.
95 Ross, supra note 81, at 499, 502; see also LYTLE, supra note 94, at 6-7, 15-18,
25, 29-42.
96 See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); see also POWE, THE WARREN
COURT, supra note 34, at 129-30 (commenting that in Hand, "[t]he South had
acquired an ally of unquestioned and unquestionable stature").
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sputtered badly, at the very end of the 1950s, 97 yet as the new
decade dawned, southern animus towards the Warren Court
could draw on a reservoir of support that reached well beyond
expressly segregationist critics of Brown.
PART IV
Next to Brown in the pantheon of Warren Court rulings
there is of course Baker v. Carr. As Robert McCloskey wrote just
months after Baker came down, with the sole exception of Brown
I "it is hard to recall a decision in modern history which has had
such an immediate and significant effect on the practical course
of events."98 Baker came from the South, from Tennessee, and
although it did not directly involve race, 99 its core, landmark
holding that challenges to representational apportionments
alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause are indeed justiciable, 100 was greatly aided and
informed by, if not explicitly based upon, 101 the Court's previous
vindication of black citizens' municipal right to vote in Tuskegee,
Alabama, just sixteen months earlier in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.10 2
Additionally, even though gross malapportionment was not a
problem exclusive to southern states-Illinois, for instance, was
notoriously imbalanced' 03 -most southern states, including
particularly Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolinal 04-- suffered
from districting schemes that gave vastly exaggerated
representation to rural counties and truncated the potential
political power of city and suburban voters.
97 See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 1957-
1960, at 13 (1961); see also WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE
STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962).
98 Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV.
54, 56 (1962).
99 See GENE GRAHAM, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: BAKER V. CARR AND THE AMERICAN
LEVELLERS 14 (1972) (stating that the legislative apportionment issue in Baker v.
Carr had its earliest roots in the disparate opinions of Tennessee citizens concerning
the abolition of slavery).
100 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
101 Id. at 229-31.
102 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
103 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
104 See generally Bryant Simon, The Devaluation of the Vote: Legislative
Apportionment and Inequality in South Carolina, 1890-1962, S.C. HIST. MAG., July
1996, at 227-45; cf. POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 493 ("[T]he South
had some of the most starkly malapportioned legislatures.").
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As Stephen Ansolabehere and Sam Issacharoff have rightly
said, Baker "marked a profound transformation in American
democracy." 105 Indeed, no doubt the single best-known and most
widely-quoted characterization of Baker is that of Earl Warren
himself, who termed it-and not Brown-"the most important
case of my tenure on the Court."106 William Ross recounts how
Baker too quickly became a "lightning rod for criticism of the
Court,"10 7 but, unlike the Court's hesitation and uncertainty in
the wake of both Brown I and II, the Justices quickly followed up
on and extended the meaning and application of Baker's holding
with alacrity. First came Gray v. Sanders in 1963, striking down
Georgia's notorious "county unit system" for electing statewide
officials,108  then Wesberry v. Sanders, voiding Georgia's
malapportioned congressional districts, in early 1964.109
But the crowning shock was Reynolds v. Sims in June, 1964,
which constitutionally mandated equipopulous districting for
both houses of bicameral state legislatures, and not just the
lower chambers. Reynolds's Equal Protection holding cited first
and foremost to Brown v. Board of Education rather than to
earlier voting cases, 110 and as Michal Belknap has emphasized,
"[t]he Warren Court saw its reapportionment rulings as based on
the same constitutional guarantee as Brown v. Board of
Education and perceived a close relationship between the two."' 1
Writing in the New York Times a few days after Reynolds
and its five companion cases came down,11 2 Anthony Lewis said
that the breadth of Reynolds's holding left even sympathetic
observers "stunned."113 Ansolabehere and Issacharoff, looking
back forty years later, called Reynolds "an earth-shattering
decision, going well beyond what anyone could have anticipated
105 Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 297, 297 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
106 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
107 Ross, supra note 81, at 532; see also LYTLE, supra note 94, at 8-9.
108 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
109 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
11o See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
1l Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown, supra note 10, at 887-88.
112 See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Md. Comm. for
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); Davis v. Mann, 377
U.S. 678, 690 (1964) (Virginia); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware);
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado).
113 Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Moves Again to Exert Its Powerful Influence,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1964, at E3.
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from the Court's holding in Baker v. Carr."114 Scot Powe agrees,
saying that Reynolds went "far beyond what anyone thought that
Baker had foretold." Recalling Earl Warren's characterization of
Baker as his Court's most important case, Powe adds that "when
he said Baker he meant Reynolds."115
William Ross recounts how the hostile conservative reaction
to Reynolds eclipsed the earlier criticism of Baker. Indeed, it's
fascinating to appreciate how almost completely the
historiography of the 1960s has forgotten just how intense the
negative response to Reynolds was. For example, two months
after the ruling, the House of Representatives, by a floor vote of
218 to 175, approved a bill eliminating federal courts' jurisdiction
over all pending, and future, complaints challenging the
apportionment of state legislatures. 116 The measure had no
chance of passage in the Senate, but a year later a decisive
majority of senators voted in favor of a proposed constitutional
amendment that would allow states with bicameral legislatures
to apportion one house on a basis other than population equality.
That margin of fifty-seven to thirty-nine fell short of the two-
thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment, 117 and a
year later a repeat attempt secured another insufficient fifty-five
to thirty-eight majority. 118  In addition, a constitutional
convention to consider such an amendment could be called at the
request of two-thirds of state legislatures, and although a total of
thirty-three state legislatures did approve such a call between
1964 and 1969, that figure fell one state short of the thirty-four
required.119
114 Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 105, at 322.
115 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 247.
116 E.W. Kenworthy, House Votes Ban on Court Power to Reapportion, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1964, at 1.
117 E.W. Kenworthy, Dirksen Proposal on Redistricting Beaten in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1965, at 1.
118 E.W. Kenworthy, Senate Again Balks Dirksen by Seven Votes in Districting
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1966, at 1.
119 See Wisconsin Refuses to Become 34th State to Adopt Dirksen Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1969, at 37; Constitutional Convention Drive Gets Mixed Response in
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1969, at 17; Warren Weaver, Jr., Senators Take Up
Charter Parley, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1969, at 27; Foes Losing Fight on One Man,
One Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1965, at 27; E.W. Kenworthy, Dirksen Hopeful on
Apportioning, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1965, at 39. Twenty-eight of those thirty-three
states approved their resolutions prior to 1967; four did so in 1967. Fred P. Graham,
Efforts to Amend the Constitution on Districts Gain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1967, at 1.
One state, Iowa, approved the resolution in 1969. Fred P. Graham, Thirty-Third
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Yet just as fascinating as the historical amnesia about the
scope of hostile response to Baker and Reynolds is the speed with
which that hostility dissolved and disappeared. Ross writes that
after 1966, opposition to equipopulous representation "quickly
withered away," 120 and Powe remarks that "Reynolds went from
debatable in 1964 to unquestionable in 1968."121 Yet the
historiography is remarkably incurious and silent as to why this
bout of opposition to the Warren Court-arguably for a time the
strongest counterattack that occurred-melted away so quickly
and quietly. Ross suggests that "the prominence of
segregationists among proponents of Court-curbing helped to
stigmatize efforts to curb the Court even among many advocates
of states' rights," but further exploration would be desirable.1 22
PART V
One of the least appreciated aspects of the Warren Court's
jurisprudence concerns what Powe has called "[t]he [g]eography
of [c]onstitutional [v]iolations."1 23  Powe indeed argues further
that "the dominant motif of the Warren Court is an assault on
the South as a unique legal and cultural region."124 Yet beyond
the panoply of de jure segregation statutes and ordinances, and
State Backs Dirksen Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1969, at 60.
120 Ross, supra note 81, at 585.
121 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 255.
122 Ross, supra note 81, at 611; see also Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus,
Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 985, 966 (1990)
(reporting, without further discussion, that based on the retrospective analysis of
contemporary opinion polling, "the issue of reapportionment was almost invisible to
the national public in 1964 and 1966 and generated no recollections among those re-
interviewed in 1975"); Warren Weaver, Jr., Support Is Found for Redistricting, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1969, at 55 (reporting that only twenty-three percent of respondents
to a June Gallup Poll survey endorsed an anti-reapportionment view, as opposed to
fifty-two percent who supported equal districting, with twenty-five percent
undecided).
123 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 489; see also Karen O'Connor,
The Supreme Court and the South, 63 J. POL. 701, 711 (2001) ("[T]he South ... is the
source of a disproportionate amount of litigation that results in a full hearing before
the U.S. Supreme Court."); Swisher, supra note 17, at 282 ("Because of the peculiar
economic and social problems of the South, certain groups of constitutional and
statutory issues are raised primarily in cases which arise in that environment."). It
is crucial to appreciate that O'Connor's definition of the South encompasses not only
the traditional eleven states, but also the District of Columbia, a definition that may
call into serious question her data concerning "the neglected role of the South in
setting the agenda of the Supreme Court." O'Connor, supra, at 702, 708.
124 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 490.
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the widespread discriminatory application of ostensibly nonracial
voter registration tests and devices, which were finally swept
aside not by Supreme Court rulings but only by the executive and
Congress's enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,125 lies a
further crucial arena in which race and region were powerful and
perhaps decisive subtexts in a set of rulings "that remade the
entire American system of criminal justice."126
Of the Warren Court's four most landmark criminal
procedure holdings-Mapp, Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda-
only one, Gideon, came from the South-Panama City, Florida-
and Clarence Earl Gideon was of course white, not black. Dollree
Mapp, of Cleveland, Ohio, was black, however, and there is a
widespread consensus indeed that Mapp v. Ohio "set in motion
the criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s."127 Mapp suffered
a warrantless home invasion and forceful physical restraint at
the hands of a small army of city policemen, and, as the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights observed in a report issued within
months of the Mapp decision, "statistics suggest that Negroes
feel the brunt of official brutality proportionately more than any
other group in American society."128
Powe contends that "[f]or the quarter-century prior to Mapp
v. Ohio, the Court's criminal procedure cases were thinly
disguised race cases," for, much as the Civil Rights Commission
observed, "African-Americans were disproportionately affected by
whatever abuses or inequities there were in the criminal justice
system."129  Corinna Lain agrees, saying that as of 1961 the
Justices "knew from prior cases that the most egregious abuses of
police power were perpetrated against blacks." She adds that
"[p]articularly in the Deep South... defendants were routinely
treated like pieces of meat to be processed and then forwarded for
proper packaging." 130
125 See generally DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK
BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976); see also South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965); cf. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
126 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 412.
127 Id. at 195.
128 5 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE: 1961 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS REPORT 27 (1961).
129 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 386, 492.
130 Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the
Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361,
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Robert Glennon makes the point that "[b]efore the civil
rights movement, the Supreme Court appeared extremely
reluctant to interfere with state criminal proceedings," and as
late as "the early 1950s, the Supreme Court displayed enormous
deference to state courts," "even in cases involving claims of
African-American civil rights violations." 131 In the early 1960s
that suddenly began to change, and virtually every scholar of the
criminal justice revolution believes that the contemporaneous
Black freedom struggle was a major spur underlying the Warren
Court's decisions.
Herbert Packer was seemingly the first observer to make
that argument, in 1966. "Perhaps the most powerful propellant"
towards recognizing the human dignity of criminal suspects,
Packer said, "has been provided by the Negro's struggle for his
civil rights and the response to that struggle by law enforcement
in the Southern states."'132 Kenneth Pye seconded that conclusion
two years later, writing that "[tlhe Court's concern with criminal
procedure can be understood only in the context of the struggle
for civil rights."133
But that conclusion has more than held up over time.
Writing four decades after Packer, Corinna Lain observed that
"one thing the burgeoning civil rights movement did was give the
Supreme Court a reason to distrust the states, especially on
matters of criminal procedure."'134  That same year, Michal
Belknap stated that "firm opposition to racial discrimination also
underlay the Warren Court's famous and controversial criminal
justice decisions," for "there was a close link between imposing
national standards on law enforcement and promoting the
1371, 1388 (2004); see also William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997) ("The post-1960
constitutionalization of criminal procedure arose, in large part, out of the sense that
the system was treating black suspects and defendants much worse than white ones.
Warren-era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination
law.").
131 Glennon, supra note 78, at 884, 889, 924.
132 Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM.
LAw, CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 238, 240 (1966). Packer added that "[w]hat we
have seen in the South is the perversion of the criminal process into an instrument
of official oppression," and "the experience in the South during the last decade has
driven home the lesson that law enforcement unchecked by law is tyrannous." Id.
133 A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 249, 256 (1969).
134 Lain, supra note 130, at 1388.
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equality, particularly racial equality, to which the Warren
Court. . . was so deeply committed."
135
Belknap's point about the Court's desire to impose and
expand national standards is an important one that criminal
justice scholars underscore. "[Tihe thrust of the Court's
landmark cases," Ronald Wright notes, "was to centralize, to
push state systems toward a more uniform criminal process." It
was also a dual-pronged effort, for the Warren Court "unified
criminal justice," Wright says, both "by restricting the discretion
of police officers operating in the field and of trial judges" in state
courtrooms.
136
Mapp was an important example of the former; Gideon, for
all its fame, was a less important reflection of the latter. Powe
calls Gideon "the last important purely southern criminal
procedure case" in a lineage that reached back to the Scottsboro
appeals in the 1930s.' 37 It also was of modest practical import,
for as Yale Kamisar has emphasized, even "prior to Gideon, most
states provided indigent defendants with assigned counsel in all
serious criminal cases as a matter of state law. ' 138 Kamisar also
notes that "Gideon is the only major Warren Court criminal
procedure ruling in favor of the defense that met widespread
applause," rather than criticism.' 39 Indeed it was the only one
that mandated the presence of lawyers in a courtroom, rather
than particular behavior for police officers on the streets. It
brought a small number of "outlier" states into full compliance
with national norms, and, as Powe observes, "cases that did not
implicitly single out the South were always far more
controversial than cases attacking southern backwardness," as
with Gideon.140
The Warren Court's two other landmark criminal procedure
rulings, Escobedo v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona, epitomized
135 Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown, supra note 10, at 888-89; see also
Donald Braman, Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2097,
2106 (2006).
136 Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to State
Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2002).
137 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 386.
138 Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement
Affected His Work as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 11, 20 (2005); see also
Wright, supra note 136, at 1435 ("Some of the Warren Court's most celebrated cases,
such as Gideon v. Wainwright, impacted a surprisingly small number of states.").
139 Kamisar, supra note 138, at 23.
140 POwE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 386.
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the Court's shift toward the imposition of per se rules in place of
the discretionary, case-by-case reasonableness or "balancing"
analysis that had characterized pre-1960 decisions.141 Corinna
Lain has noted that "in Miranda, racial concerns were just
beneath the surface of the Supreme Court's opinion,"142 and as
George Thomas has explained, once an inflexible universal rule
was imposed, "there was no need to think about race in deciding
interrogation cases" by probing the particular context of police
behavior. 143 But underlying that shift from particularized
reasonableness to rule-bound formalism was the Justices' own
evolving view of how racially-discriminatory the criminal justice
system could be: "[Tihe Court gradually lost confidence in the
integrity of Southern state judges."1 44
PART VI
Yet the famous criminal procedure rulings like Mapp,
Gideon, and Miranda are only one-half of the South's double-
barreled contribution to the Warren Court's criminal justice
revolution. The other, far less heralded portion involves the
family of cases governing state criminal defendants' access to the
federal courts both before, and after, convictions against them
have been obtained. Much, though not all, of the latter falls
within the bounds of federal habeas jurisdiction; much, though
not all, of the former, hinges on the concepts of exhaustion and
abstention. Both arenas involve complex and highly technical
questions of law where attempts at simple summary and
interpretation run a far higher than normal risk of unintended
error and imprecision, but the practical import of these decisions,
and the extent to which they were direct byproducts of southern
malfeasance and Black agency, requires that technical
complexity not preclude their discussion.
The modern story begins with "the other Brown," Brown v.
Allen, decided just months before Earl Warren's arrival as Chief
Justice. As Robert Glennon explains, "Brown authorized habeas
corpus review of all issues of federal constitutional law alleged to
have been erroneously decided by the state courts" that imposed
141 See Glennon, supra note 78, at 903.
142 Lain, supra note 130, at 1444.
143 Thomas, supra note 29, at 7.
144 Glennon, supra note 78, at 902.
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and upheld a criminal defendant's conviction. 145 Brown itself
"involved a claim of race discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury that indicted the defendant" for rape in Forsyth
County, North Carolina, and following conviction the defendant
was sentenced to death. 146 But as important as Brown was when
it was decided, 147 it had even great potential impact in the future,
for, as Scot Powe has put it, if and when constitutional rights
themselves expanded, "then there would be an equal expansion of
issues that could be raised on habeas" in petitions to federal
courts. 14
8
The opening salvo in the Warren Court's access to federal
courts revolution came in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape, decided just a
few months before Mapp. Like Mapp, Monroe too came from a
northern urban setting-this time Chicago-where black
householders--James and Flossie Monroe and their six
children-had suffered a warrantless early morning police
invasion accompanied by gratuitous racial epithets and casual
physical assault. 49 The Monroes brought a federal suit for
damages against the offending police officers, and, after suffering
dismissal in the lower courts, won a landmark reversal allowing
them to proceed from the Supreme Court. 150 The explicitly racial
context of the case was clear beyond any shadow of a doubt.
Glennon rightly observes that "the Court accomplished its goal of
giving civil rights plaintiffs a hearing before a federal judge,'15'
and Powe, quickly counterbalancing the difference between
short-term obscurity and long-term impact, rues how Monroe, "so
important for the past three decades, remained an obscure case
until after the Warren era."' 52
145 Id. at 908.
146 Id.
147 Cf. David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, § 6
(Magazine), at 65 (recounting how future Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, as a
law clerk to Justice Robert H. Jackson at the time of Brown, privately inveighed
against the decision).
148 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 421.
149 See Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 365-66 (7th Cir. 1959); see also Myriam
Gilles, Police, Race and Crime in 1950s Chicago: Monroe v. Pape as Legal Noir, in
CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES (Risa Goluboff & Myriam Gilles eds., forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript at 59, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=984929).
150 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 192 (1961).
151 Glennon, supra note 78, at 923.
152 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 230-31.
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In early 1963, ten years after Brown v. Allen, came Fay v.
Noia and Townsend v. Sain, decided the very same day as
Gideon. Noia, Glennon writes, was a "landmark ruling" that
"profoundly altered the habeas corpus landscape" 153 and, as Lain
explains, in tandem with Townsend "allowed federal courts to
more easily scrutinize the treatment of black defendants by
Southern criminal justice systems."15 4 The practical upshot, as
Glennon succinctly summarizes, was that "during the civil rights
movement, the Court created the redundant and repetitive
system of habeas corpus as a response to the flood of cases
coming from state courts and arising out of the civil rights
movement. Expanding the scope of federal habeas corpus
channeled literally thousands of sit-in and other public
demonstration cases into federal courts for federal judicial
decisions," and thus out of the hands of southern state jurists
whose racial fairmindedness the Justices had learned to doubt
and distrust.155
Scot Powe recounts how "Noia, because it seemed like a
technical issue of federal jurisdiction, initially passed unnoticed
by the press."'156 However, since it held "that any state prisoner
claiming his constitutional rights had been violated could go to
federal court to challenge his conviction once state remedies were
first exhausted," the issue of "exhaustion" then became front and
center for many civil rights defendants facing prosecution, or
sometimes serial persecution, in southern state courts.' 57 As
Glennon writes, "[e]xhaustion postpones the exercise of federal
jurisdiction until after a state court or agency has ruled," but, he
quips, given the behavior of white southern authorities during
the civil rights era, "the exhaustion requirement seemed more
likely to exhaust civil rights activists and their lawyers."'158
153 Glennon, supra note 78, at 910.
154 Lain, supra note 130, at 1396-97.
155 Glennon, supra note 78, at 918; see also Kenneth N. Vines, Southern State
Supreme Courts and Race Relations, 18 W. POL. Q. 5, 17 (1965) ("The decision record
of state courts justifies the unfavorable perceptions which led Negroes in large part
to avoid them.").
156 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 424.
157 Id. at 422.
158 Glennon, supra note 78, at 920, 919; see also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal
and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793
(1965).
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In response to that problem, the Warren Court in 1965
issued one of its most radical, if nonetheless eventually
shortlived, decisions. Dombrowski v. Pfister "profoundly
changed" defense attorneys' opportunities to 'remove' pending
prosecutions of civil rights defendants from state to federal
courts.' 59 As Glennon rightly observes, Dombrowski rested on "a
latent presumption of bad faith among state judges,"' 60 but it also
reflected the Warren Court's profoundly hostile attitude toward
federalism, an attitude the South had insistently nurtured for all
of the preceding decade. Powe articulates that attitude
acerbically but accurately: "Federalism served no ascertainable
purpose except to authorize local-and typically southern-
oligarchies to impose their backwards and often arbitrary views
on those unfortunate enough to live within their jurisdictions."'161
Another 1965 exemplar of the Justices' profound doubts
about southern justice came in the now little-remembered case of
Henry v. Mississippi.162 The case may be all but forgotten, but its
defendant-appellant was well-known and justly famous: Aaron
Henry, at that time Mississippi's most important-and
bisexual-black civil rights activist. 163 Henry had been arrested
for propositioning a young hitch-hiker, and the key dispute
following Henry's conviction for disturbing the peace was
whether his attorney's failure to object at trial to the admission
of some seized evidence precluded a claim of constitutional error
in that regard from being raised on appeal. The Mississippi
Supreme Court answered affirmatively, 164 and the U.S. Supreme
Court had to judge whether adequate state grounds underlay
that ruling.
The specific details the U.S. Court relied upon in reversing
and remanding Henry's conviction need not concern us here, but
the Supreme Court's "confusing"'165 opinion immediately led legal
159 Glennon, supra note 78, at 925.
160 Id. at 927.
161 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 494.
162 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
163 See JOHN HOWARD, MEN LIKE THAT: A SOUTHERN QUEER HISTORY, at xvi-
xvii, 158-66 (1999).
164 See Henry v. State, 154 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1963).
165 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 561 (5th ed. 2003); see also William P. Marshall,
The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787,
794-95 (2001).
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commentators to ask whether the ,decision made sense only in
light of the petitioner's identity and the fact that "the prosecution
was commenced in 1962 in Mississippi and not at another time
and in another place."'166 Indeed, that judgment has held up for
four full decades. As Catherine Struve has observed, "Henry may
be best explained by its facts, for the Court's willingness
to suggest procedural inadequacy may have stemmed from
suspicion that the Mississippi state courts were biased against
Aaron Henry."16 7  That interpretation draws further strength
when one appreciates that the Supreme Court heard argument in
Henry's case in mid-October 1964, just two months after Henry
led the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's heavily-
publicized challenge at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention.168
Both Struve and Glennon conclude that "the context
influenced Henry's outcome,"'1 9 and both further suggest that the
Supreme Court stretched to make a ruling it otherwise would not
have only because the defendant-appellant was a prominent and
much-persecuted southern black activist. Indeed, the most
powerful support for that interpretation, multiple commentators
have explained, is the Justices' subsequent abandonment of the
seemingly significant doctrinal alteration that Henry initially
appeared to propound. Struve writes that "Henry itself appears
to have had scant influence on the Court's subsequent
practice,"1 70 and William Marshall has memorably categorized
Henry as "a rough justice decision that would eventually lead
nowhere." 171
Glennon, Powe, and Lain all emphasize how vastly different
in reach and implication southern civil rights-based rulings like
Dombrowski and Henry were from subsequent criminal
procedure and access to federal courts decisions that the
166 Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 190 (1965).
167 Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the
Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 274 (2003).
168 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 443 (1965).
169 Struve, supra note 167, at 276; see also Glennon, supra note 78, at 899.
170 Struve, supra note 167, at 276.
171 Marshall, supra note 165, at 794. Oddly enough, in the end Henry's criminal
conviction was reinstated, and the Supreme Court declined review in a brief order
echoing its suggestion in Hawkins that the petitioner pursue relief by means of a
federal habeas petition in district court. See Henry v. State, 202 So. 2d 40 (Miss.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968).
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Supreme Court began handing down in 1967. Chief among those
was Walker v. City of Birmingham,172 which upheld contempt of
court convictions against Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil
rights activists dating from the famous Birmingham protests of
early 1963.173 Glennon writes that "Walker offers a striking
contrast to Henry, decided only two years earlier,"'174 and Powe
remarks that Dombrowski, also a 1965 ruling, "was from the era
of peaceful protests" while "Walker [was] from the subsequent era
of riots and disorder."'175
Lain makes a similar argument, focusing on Terry v. Ohio, 76
a 1968 Fourth Amendment decision that was as symbolically
different from Miranda as Walker was from Dombrowski. "[I]n
the face of clear evidence that police were using stop and frisk to
harass minorities, the Supreme Court condoned the practice,
breaking from an entire line of established Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to do it," writes Lain. "Terry was as much a blow
to the civil rights movement as it was a bow to law enforcement
interests," she adds, and reflected how the wave of urban riots
had "dramatically" changed Black Americans' "public image" in
"the course of just a few years" as a "loss of empathy for the
plight of blacks" enveloped jurists as well as other whites. 177
Three years later, in Younger v. Harris,178 the Court would gut,
and effectively overrule, Dombrowski.
PART VII
Well before that turn of events, however, the Warren Court
would finally begin to attend to the two most glaring loose ends
that it had purposely left unresolved in the mid- and late-1950s.
In May of 1964, on the tenth anniversary of Brown I, the New
York Times reported that only 1.18% of black students in the
South were attending desegregated schools, many of those in
Texas. In implementing and applying Brown, the Times went on,
the Supreme Court "has not gone beyond the limits described by
172 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
173 See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 566, 579 (1986); see also ALAN
F. WESTIN & BARRY MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974).
174 Glennon, supra note 78, at 900.
175 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 282.
176 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
177 Lain, supra note 130, at 1446-47.
178 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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[Circuit] Judge John J. Parker" in his famous and influential
Briggs dictum. 179  One week later, just as Congress moved
towards passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court in
Griffin v. County School Board,180 one of the original four cases
that comprised Brown, belatedly announced that "[t]here has
been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in
enforcing the constitutional rights" of black southern
schoolchildren in the nine years since the Court employed that
unfortunate phrase in Brown I. Indeed, the Justices said, "[t]he
time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out."181 A year later, in a
case from Richmond, the Court decreed that "[d]elays in
desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable." 18 2
But three more years would pass before the Warren Court, in
Green v. County School Board, a case argued just the day before
the civil rights movement, as many Americans saw it, came to an
untimely end-April 3, 1968-announced that a "transition to a
unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the
ultimate end to be brought about."18 3 Fourteen years late, and, in
all frankness, only because of the firm and clear analytical
persistence of John Minor Wisdom and his supportive colleagues
on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,18 4 the Warren Court finally
answered the question that it had failed to ask itself in either
Brown I or Brown I.185 Green issued the clarion call that had
been absent from Brown, from Cooper, and from Griffin, and
warned starkly that "delays are no longer tolerable."18 6 A year
later, in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education,8 7 the
South would learn that this time the Court meant what it said.
179 Claude Sitton, Since the School Decree: Decade of Racial Ferment, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1964, at 1.
180 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964); see also Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
181 Griffin, 377 U.S. at 234.
182 Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965); see also Rogers v. Paul, 382
U.S. 198 (1965).183 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968); see also Monroe v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
184 See David J. Garrow, Visionaries of the Law: John Minor Wisdom and Frank
M. Johnson, Jr., 109 YALE L.J. 1219, 1222-26 (2000); POWE, THE WARREN COURT,
supra note 34, at 293-95; see also United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966); Joel Wm. Friedman, Desegregating the South: John
Minor Wisdom's Role in Enforcing Brown's Mandate, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2207 (2004).
185 See POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34.
186 391 U.S. at 438.
187 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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The other loose end was far easier to resolve and far more
susceptible to definitive resolution. In late 1964 the Court moved
significantly beyond the ugly legacy of Jackson v. Alabama and
Naim v. Naim when it struck down a Florida law criminalizing
interracial cohabitation.1 8 8 As Julius Chambers has perceptively
emphasized, "it was not until 1964," in McLaughlin, "that the
Warren Court expressly enunciated a rule that racial
classifications, standing alone, were presumptively suspect"
under the Equal Protection Clause.18 9 Three years later, the
Court went the rest of the way toward remedying Jackson and
Naim when it struck down all remaining anti-miscegenation
statutes in the best-named law case of all time, Loving v.
Virginia.1 90 With Loving, as with Green a year later, the Warren
Court had tardily but eventually made full amends for its
greatest failings of courage and acuity more than a decade
earlier.
PART VIII
But there remains one final, and in some respects most
unusual of all, category of cases in which the impact of southern
misbehavior on the Justices of the Warren Court significantly
and for all time changed important and ostensibly non-racial-
and non-regional-questions of law. Near the top of this category
are the related and interwoven First Amendment freedom of
association decisions from the late 1950s and early 1960s in
which the Warren Court struck down a variety of southern
attempts to put the NAACP and/or its lawyers out of business in
one state after another. Most of these efforts involved statutes
aimed at forcing the public disclosure of members' identities,
some on the grounds that the NAACP was an out-of-state
enterprise, others based on the precedent that communist
infiltration could be discovered only through such public
exposure.
Alabama's attacks were the best known and, for a time, the
most successful, but after years of litigation, in the end the
NAACP, and the Warren Court, fully prevailed. 191 Arkansas,
192
188 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
189 Julius L. Chambers, Race and Equality, in THE WARREN COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 21, 23 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
190 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
191 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 310 (1964); NAACP v.
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Louisiana, 193 Virginia, 194 and Florida 195 all saw litigation over
such efforts which made its way up to the Supreme Court, and
the most doctrinally far-reaching of these cases, such as Gibson
from Florida, represented significant doctrinal expansion.
Glennon perceptively notes that the behavior of Alabama and the
other states unintentionally served to highlight "the vacuous
nature of claims that state sovereignty in the South deserved
respect during the civil rights movement,"' 96 a legacy that took
some decades to dissipate.
Far more widely known than the NAACP cases is New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the premier libel law ruling in U.S.
history. Sullivan grew out of yet further efforts by Alabama
officialdom to retaliate against civil rights activists and those
who gave voice to their cause. 197 As William Marshall has
written, prior to Sullivan, libel law "had traditionally been
within the exclusive province of the states," and the Warren
Court's ruling "removed a traditionally state-bound and state-
defined common law action from the state courts (and state
legislators) into the jurisdiction of the federal courts."' 98 Indeed,
as Rod Smolla has written, "[h]ad the events surrounding the
Sullivan lawsuit not been so patently racist, in fact, it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court would have bothered to hear just
another libel suit at all."199
Sullivan's "actual malice" standard200 was, as Marshall
writes, a ruling of "enormous breadth and consequence,"'20 1 and
three years later another libel appeal stemming from a civil
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Walter Murphy, The South Counterattacks:
The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL. Q. 371, 371-90 (1959); TUSHNET, supra note 77,
at 283-300.
192 See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960).
193 Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
194 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
195 Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
196 Glennon, supra note 78, at 895.
197 See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 11-14, 21-22 (1991).
198 Marshall, supra note 165, at 793; see also Glennon, supra note 78, at 904
("The civil rights movement was the first time in U.S. history that state libel
judgments became subject to First Amendment limitations.").
199 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 44 (1986).
200 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
201 Marshall, supra note 165, at 793.
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rights face-off--James Meredith's 1962 desegregation of the
University of Mississippi in the face of a violent white mob led by
retired Army General Edwin A. Walker-extended Sullivan's
protection of the news media yet further. 20 2 Indeed, as Scot Powe
writes: "When Warren left the Court, the First Amendment was
far more protective than it had ever been, and without the South
it is unlikely that it could have had either such breadth or such
depth .... "203
Last of all comes a little-remembered set of cases that in the
end fell short of their revolutionary promise but that nonetheless
provided some invaluable procedural protections to many of "the
least of these"-recipients of public assistance payments. The
welfare rights movement is now a largely forgotten part of late
1960s/early 1970s activism, 20 4 and its initial strategy of
"converting welfare rights into a southern civil rights issue" is
remembered only by a hardy few. 20 5  That movement's first
signature Supreme Court case, King v. Smith, originated-just
like Reynolds v. Sims-in one of the southern struggle's most
storied locales: Dallas County, Alabama. There, as in some
eighteen states, single-parent recipients of AFDC (Aid to
Families With Dependent Children) funds could have their
payments cut off if welfare caseworkers determined that a so-
called "substitute father" sometimes co-habited with the
children's mother. Scot Powe notes that these "man-in-the-house
regulations were not exclusively southern, but well over half the
states that had them" were in the South.20 6 Even more notably,
"of 184 welfare cases closed under the substitute father
regulations in Dallas County, Alabama, from July 1964 through
January 1967, 182 involved black families." Similarly, "[d]uring
June 1966, in seven representative Alabama counties, every one
of the more than 600 recipients cut off welfare was black."
20 7
202 Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967).
203 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 491; see also HARRY KALVEN,
JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65-67 (1965).
204 See generally NICK KOTZ & MARY LYNN KOTZ, A PASSION FOR EQUALITY:
GEORGE A. WILEY AND THE MOVEMENT (1977).
205 MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 56 (1993); see also Robert M. Cover, Note, Federal
Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 94 (1967).
206 POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 493.
207 DAVIS, supra note 205, at 64.
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When Alabama appealed King v. Smith to the Supreme
Court after a lower federal court ruled against the state, the
Justices unanimously struck down the "substitute father" policy
on the narrow but straightforward grounds that needy children
should not be denied public aid on account of maternal boyfriends
who owed them no duty of support.208 The Court did not
expressly address the overtly racial context of the case, but the
facts of the matter left little doubt that King was a profoundly
southern case. Welfare rights strategists hoped to sustain their
litigation campaign with further southern test cases, but when
Mississippi settled rather than contest a decisive challenge to
benefit terminations without recipients being accorded a fair
prior hearing, the movement's legal arm "began to move away
from its southern strategy."209 Welfare rights lawyers would win
that crucial guarantee in Goldberg v. Kelly, an important
Supreme Court case from New York, but the movement's more
far-reaching agenda suffered decisive rejection in a rushed set of
cases that culminated with Dandridge v. Williams in 1970.210
PART IX
On the occasion of Brown's tenth anniversary in 1964,
Anthony Lewis of the New York Times wrote that "the decision
has had a profound impact on the place of the Court itself in our
governmental system, on Federal-state relations, on law and
politics generally." For the Supreme Court itself, "tackling the
race problem gave it the courage," Lewis observed, "to take on
other difficult issues," such as reapportionment and criminal
justice reform. 211
"Within the judicial system," Lewis went on, "the racial
conflict has changed Federal-state relations in ways not
yet sufficiently recognized. The refusal of state executives,
policemen and judges to enforce the Constitution has led the
Federal courts to pull away from their tradition of deference to
state tribunals. Cases are before Federal judges that could not
have been imagined there 10 years ago." Furthermore, Lewis
added, "Southern efforts to put the N.A.A.C.P. out of business
208 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968).
209 DAVIS, supra note 205, at 68.
210 397 U.S. 471 (1970); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
211 Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Enlarging Role as Instrument of Social
Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1964, at 24.
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have led to Supreme Court decisions giving new protection to
freedom of association," and similar attacks on other activists led
directly to Sullivan.212
More than forty years later, no law professor or historian has
fundamentally improved upon the insightfulness and breadth of
Lewis's analysis. But Lewis noted too, even in 1964, that the
Court's rulings had drawn increased attacks, yet he explained
that "many of the critics are doubtless motivated, underneath, by
the school decision."213 Four years later, at the very. end of the
Warren era, William Beaney expanded upon that point in a most
instructive way. "It cannot be overstressed," Beaney wrote, "that
this violent and persistent attack on the Court by the political
leaders of a substantial section of the nation has affected public
reaction to other important Court decisions. For here was a
large, vocal minority eager to discredit the Court in every
conceivable way."21 4
Beaney's comment frames a crucially important panoptic
perspective. It is of course easy for any knowledgeable scholar to
affirmatively detail how the Warren Court and its rulings, from
Brown to Green, from Baker to Reynolds, and from Gideon to
Loving to King, helped fundamentally revolutionize the South.
But the converse of that relationship deserves equal if not
greater attention and appreciation, for at the same time that the
Warren Court revolutionized the South, the long-standing
southern white traditions of legal defiance and overarching
racism greatly influenced and altered the judicial behavior and
decisions of the Warren Court.
The public attacks are of course the easiest to appreciate and
measure. At the outset, in the immediate wake of Brown, the
Court as we have seen did everything possible-in Jackson, in
Williams, in Naim, and in Hawkins-to avoid stirring further
212 Id.
213 Id.; see also POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 496 (commenting
that for white southerners, after Escobedo and Miranda, "still hating the Court
because of Brown, now they could publicly hate it because of coddling criminals").
214 William M. Beaney, The Warren Court and the Political Process, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 343, 348-49 (1968); see also Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 122, at 1000,
1004 (reporting that among interviewees in 1966, "the more knowledgeable
Southern whites were about the Court, the less likely they were to express support
for it" and adding that "[a] large share of white Southerners who were well informed
were angrily nonsupportive"); High Court Found in Disfavor, 3 to 2, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 1968, at 19 (reporting a Gallup Poll analysis that "Southerners are more
critical of the Court than are persons living in other regions of the nation").
[Vol. 82:1
BAD BEHAVIOR MAKES BIG LAW
controversy and opposition in the South. That effort failed
abysmally, in part because of "Red Monday" and Mallory, and
Cooper can be viewed at least in part as reflecting a clear if tardy
institutional realization that forthrightness was superior to
expediency. By the time of Baker, and Reynolds, just as with
Mapp and then Miranda and in time both Loving and Green, it
was clear beyond doubt that the Warren Court was no longer
preoccupied with the alarums of its enemies in the way that it
had been in the years immediately after Brown.
Yet the muscular and far-reaching self-assurance that the
Warren Court exhibited from 1961 until 1967 was induced not
only by the malfeasance and dishonesty of white southern
officialdom. It also was influenced, in equal if not greater part,
by the activism and courage of newly-emboldened Black
southerners. The intensity and duration of white southern
sophistry and subterfuge spurred the Warren Court in manifold
ways. But the Court was also animated and emboldened by the
energy and breadth of the freedom struggle. Brown's embrace of
fundamental human equality was a doctrinal stimulus in and of
itself as well, for that holding made the equal protection claim in
Baker appear far more irresistibly powerful than had similar
previous iterations in the years before 1954.215 Brown also, of
course, made the all-encompassing result in Reynolds look far
more natural and preordained than would any half-a-loaf, just-
one-house decision.
Michal Belknap writes that Brown "initiated a quest for
equality by the Warren Court that over the next fifteen
years... transformed and reoriented American constitutional
law."216  That is certainly correct, as is Belknap's further
suggestion that Brown's embrace of equality served to commit
the Court "to that principle in all aspects of its jurisprudence."217
But it is imperative to appreciate that that doctrinal element is
just one-third of a tripartite story in which southern white
intransigence and Black civil rights activism played equally
crucial roles. In the criminal procedure cases, as with the
decisions expanding defendants' access to federal courts, and as
with the NAACP freedom of association rulings and Sullivan, the
interactive combination of southern bad behavior and Black
215 See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
216 Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown, supra note 10, at 878-79.
217 Id. at 891.
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activism pressed the Court to revolutionize the entire federal-
state judicial template. Distrust of southern police and southern
courts directly underlay Gideon, Henry, and Dombrowski, and
certainly informed Mapp, Monroe, and Miranda, but it also
fundamentally inclined the Justices to make the federal courts a
ready refuge for victims of pernicious southern process in ways
that were simply unimaginable in the pre-Brown era. The
NAACP cases and Sullivan are further remarkable evidence of
that metamorphosis.
As Robert Glennon has written, "[t]he substantial changes in
federal courts doctrine that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s can
be fully understood only by seeing them as the Supreme Court's
response to the actions of Southern state courts during the civil
rights movement."218  That is an historically-informed
restatement of the fundamental truth that Anthony Lewis
grasped so clearly and cogently in 1964. Furthermore, a
historical appreciation that the far-reaching legacy of the South's
collision with the Warren Court was in later years trimmed back
by subsequent decisions such as Walker and Younger underscores
the necessary caveat that not all southern-inspired changes in
"non-desegregative" areas of the law have held up over time.
Henry's message was supplanted by Walker's, and Dombrowski
gave way to Younger.
But Sullivan, Gideon, and King have without question
endured, on top of the obvious revolutions that sprang from
Brown and then from Baker. Brown's tangible legacy, especially
in southern public schoolrooms, may look less vibrant today than
was anticipated at the time of Green or Swann,219 but Baker's,
like Mapp's and Miranda's, lives on in full flower. The Warren
Court's reach was lengthier and broader than many historians
appreciate, and had it not been for white southern bad behavior
and Black courage, the Warren Court never would have reached
as far and as firmly as it did.
218 Glennon, supra note 78, at 930.
219 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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